1:Stanford U: S-4, 51956 AF15 East China
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J. Nanking

• 65 The fall of Peking to Kuomintang forces in June, 1928 marked the nominal unification of the country under the Nationalist forces. On October 10, 1928, the Nationalist Government was officially inaugurated with its capital at Nanking rather than at Peking, reflecting the predominantly southeastern composition and orientation of the Kuomintang. Nanking was closer to the power centers of both the older element of the party, largely from Kwangtung and its neighboring provinces, and to the newer business element centered on Shanghai. The new capital had been the political center of the republican provisional government set up in 1912. The removal of the capital to Peking in February 1912 had always been resented by the southern revolutionaries. The shift reflected the designs and power interests of Yüan Shih-k'ai, to whom Sun Yat-sen surrendered his leadership of the provisional government in the hope of effecting more quickly the victory of the revolution and the unity of China.

An equally compelling reason for the selection of Nanking as the national capital was the association it had for many of the southern leaders with native rule of the country. The city had been the original seat and capital of the last native dynasty to rule China, the Ming, and many southern leaders

1;Stanford U, S-4, 5 1956 AF15 East China
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•165 identified their overthrow of the alien Manchu house with the Ming Dynasty's expulsion of the foreign Mongol regime. Shortly after accepting the office of provisional president, Sun Yat-sen had led a formal ceremony before the tomb of the founder of the Ming Dynasty, Hung Wu (Chu Yüan-chang), to announce the restoration of Chinese rule over the country.

K. Chiang Kai-shek

The Kuomintang and national government centered on Nanking were under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, a native of Chekiang. He had been comparatively unknown when the Northern Expedition set out from Canton two years earlier. His western training having been confined to the military arts, he had been a minor revolutionary figure until he was given command of the Whampao Military Academy on his return from training at Moscow in 1923. As head of the academy, he acquired a military following which afforded him a power position in the Kuomintang that no civilian member could dispute with impunity. He held together the party's diverse factions by demanding their leaders' personal loyalty to himself rather than to any ideal.[39]

39. On Chiang see Linebarger, op. cit., pp. 254-72; Mary C. Wright, loc. cit.; and Theodore H. White and Annalee Jacoby, Thunder Out of China, New York, William Sloane Associates, Inc., 1946, pp. 118-31 and passim.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF15 East China
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.665 Under Chiang's leadership, the party and nation were ostensibly devoted to the realization of Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People -- nationalism, democracy, and the people's livelihood. However, the government was beset by difficulties that complicated the immediate institution of Sun's program. Moreover, Chiang seems to have been in philosophical disagreement with it. He found his models of ideal behavior in men like Tseng Kuo-fan, who had saved the Ch'ing Dynasty from the Taiping Rebellion, and was most insistent on instilling a form of reinterpreted Confucianism in the Chinese people.[40]

The territory under the real control of Nanking in 1928 extended only to the minority of provinces in or adjacent to the lower Yangtze basin. Most of China was under the direct rule of warlords who gave at best only nominal allegiance to the central government. They frequently repudiated Nanking's control in the following decade, and Communist forces dominated smaller areas after 1931.

Chiang was increasingly acknowledged as the leader of China even in areas outside his real control, as the outbreak of the anti-resistance

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40. See Mary C. Wright, loc. cit.

1;Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF15 East China
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•665 war against Japan showed. He continually strove to unite the nation by military force, maintaining that unity and the elimination of Communism in China were the most pressing problems the country faced. To Chiang's mind, their solution was a necessary condition for resistance against Japan's inroads in the North and for the institution of democracy in China. While little was done to improve the livelihood of the people in the provinces under Nanking's effective control, strides forward were made with government help in the expansion of industry and the nation's transportation and communication networks. Attention was given also to attaining the first of Sun's Three People's Principles, nationalism, by striving for tariff autonomy, the elimination of extraterritoriality, and the end of foreign concessions on Chinese soil.

L. The Ch'en Brothers

Chiang's rise to power marked a shift in the preponderance of Kuomintang leadership from the old Kwangtung revolutionaries to more moderate army officers and civilians from the East China Region, particularly from Chekiang. Among the most powerful and influential of the new leadership were the brothers Ch'en Kuo-fu and Ch'en Li-fu from Chekiang. Both were members of the party's Central Executive Committee and held positions in the party and government which controlled the training and education of China's youth

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF15 East China
~~AF15~~ AF15

665 and the party membership. To both men, the revolution had been completed with the establishment of the national capital at Nanking in 1928. They believed China's need in subsequent years was for organization and discipline, and the brothers helped to think out and promote the return to the conservative Confucian principles advocated by Chiang Kai-shek.[41]

M. Nanking and the Japanese Occupation

642 Almost as soon as the Nationalist armies were forced from the East China Region, the victorious Japanese established a puppet government at Nanking. Inaugurated in March 1938, it was known as the Reformed Government of the Republic of China. For two years the Reformed Government at Nanking existed side by side with the Provisional Government of the Republic of China, another puppet regime set up by the Japanese at Peking in December 1937. The difficulties and embarrassments attendant upon the supposed national character of the two governments were resolved in March 1940 when both were dissolved and a Reorganized National Government headed by the old Kuomintang revolutionary

41. See Linebarger, op. cit., pp. 84, 134, 142; White and Jacoby, op. cit., pp. 107-15 and passim; and Mary C. Wright, loc. cit.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF15 East China
~~AF15~~ AF15

642 Wang Ching-wei was established with its capital at Nanking as the political authority for all China. In reality, the new government like the old ones it displaced had no real power, attracted no important Chinese leaders to its standard other than Wang, and derived no real support or recognition from the Chinese people.[42]

IV. THE RISE AND VICTORY OF COMMUNISM

A. Birth of the Party in Shanghai

668 The East China Region and particularly Shanghai played an important part in the rise of Communism in China. Approximately midway between two other centers of intellectual ferment and radical thought in the early republican period -- Peking and Canton -- Shanghai was the natural meeting place of
• 665 representatives of the new ideas. In September 1920, a meeting of some eight intellectuals discussed the formation of a Communist Party in China, and at a larger gathering the next year in the same city, the Chinese

42. Linebarger, op. cit., pp. 183-210; and George E. Taylor, The Struggle for North China, New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940, pp. 159-62, 176-77.

1:Stanford U. S-4; 5 1956 AF15 East China
AF15

•665 Communist Party was formally established.[43]

The 1920 group included such famous natives of the East China Region as Chang Tung-sun, a philosopher, educator, and journalist from Chekiang who was later to become a leader of the Democratic Socialistic Party and still later to cast in his lot with the Communist regime; Shao Li-tzu, also from Chekiang, a chü-jen (holder of the second degree in the traditional examination system), and graduate of the Jesuit Universite l'Aurore at Shanghai, who later became secretary-general of the Whampao Academy and is now a non-Communist member of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress; Chang T'ai-lei from Kiangsu, organizer of the proto-Communist Social Democratic Youth Corps in 1918 and later to become a Communist martyr after his death in the abortive Canton Rebellion of 1927; and Ch'en Tu-hsiu, an Anhwei man educated in Japan and France who played the leading role in the Chinese literary and cultural revolution as an editor of Hsin-ch'ing-nien (New Youth) and professor of

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43. On the formation of the Communist Party see references, footnote 35; and Conrad Brandt, et al, A Documentary History of Chinese Communism, London, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1952, pp. 29-30, 51-65.

1;Stanford U, S-4, 5 1956 AF15 East China
~~AF15~~ AF15

665 Chinese literature at the University of Peking.[44]

None of these men was present at the 1921 Shanghai conference which founded the Chinese Communist Party, but Ch'en was elected its first chairman. He held that position until 1928 when he was read out of the party and blamed for the Communists' defeat at the hands of Chiang-Kai-shek in 1927. In 1930, he became the leader of a dissident Trotskyist group, and in 1931 was arrested by the Central People's Government and imprisoned.

B. The Ruralization of the Communist Party

Following Marxist dogma, the Party initially concentrated most of its hopes and efforts on the city proletariat. The lives or sympathies of the large following the Communists had acquired in Shanghai were wiped out by Chiang Kai-shek's coup on April 12, 1927. Thereafter, the Party's highest leaders continued without success to attempt to revive the sympathies of labor and reconstruct the shattered labor organizations. The real strength of Communism after 1927 was located in the rural Soviets at Kiangsi and

44. On Ch'en Tu-hsiu see Fairbank and Teng, op. cit., pp. 239-45, 249-51.

1:Stanford U, S-4, 5 1956 AF15 East China
~~AF15~~ AF15

•665 Fukien under Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh.[45]

Throughout its history, the Chinese Communist Party had had few leaders of proletarian origin or background. From 1927 to 1949, "the vanguard of the proletariat" lacked a worker-following as well. The ruralization of the Party after 1927 precluded the development of a significant proletarian leadership or following.[46]

As a consequence of the rural nature of the Communist Party, its main source of leadership was the agricultural provinces of China. However, Kiangsu is even with Hupeh and second only to Hunan in respect to total number of representatives contributed to the various Chinese Communist politburos or guiding bodies from 1921 through 1945. Anhwei ranks third. Moreover, Kiangsu was the only province to have two or more representatives on each of these policy-making bodies from 1927 through 1945. In percentage of membership on the Central Executive Committee of 1945, natives of Kiangsu were equally represented with those of Hupeh but outnumbered

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45. On the subsequent history of the Communist Party see reference, footnotes 35 and 43.

46. This thesis is fully developed in Schwartz, op. cit.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF15 East China
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•665 by persons from both Hunan and Szechwan. Fukien, with Shansi, had the fourth largest representation.[47]

C. Chou En-lai

The most important representative of Kiangsu from 1927 through 1945 was Chou En-lai. Grandson of a Ch'ing Dynasty official and son of a traditional scholar, Chou had shown great promise in his literary studies before he forsook them to take part in the New Culture Movement. After playing an active student role in the May Fourth Movement, he went to Paris to finish his education, helped to found a branch of the Chinese Communist Party there in 1921, and travelled to England and Germany before returning to China at the age of 26 to join the Nationalist Revolution in Canton. Sent to aid in the organization of the labor insurrection at Shanghai in 1927, Chou was one of the few leaders of the labor forces to escape Chiang's coup in April. Chou subsequently helped organize abortive Communist uprisings at Nanchang, Swatow, and Canton before joining Mao Tse-tung in the rural Soviet areas

47. Robert C. North, Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Elites, Stanford, Stanford University Press, pp. 65-71, and Appendix D, pp. 116-119.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF15 East China
~~AF15~~ AF15

665 of Kiangsi and Fukien.[48]

Though his early Communist career was involved in violence, Chou has since shown that his forte is diplomacy. Through all the turnovers in the Central Executive Committee, instigated in the first years of the Chinese Communist Party by the Soviet Union and in later years by internal power struggles, Chou has shown a remarkable ability to retain his seat.[49] He now ranks with Liu Shao-ch'i just below the Party Chairman, Mao Tse-tung. Chou was the leading Communist representative at Sian in 1936 following the kidnaping of Chiang Kai-shek by army officers dissatisfied with his appeasement policy toward Japan. By negotiating the release of the Generalissimo, Chou laid the groundwork for Kuomintang and Communist Party co-operation in the early years of the war with Japan.[50] During the war, Chou was the Communist liaison representative stationed at Chungking, and since the establishment of the Communist regime, he has been responsible for the conduct of China's foreign policy.

D. The Communists during the Resistance War Against Japan

48. Snow, op. cit., pp. 44-49.
49. See North, Moscow and Chinese Communists, pp. 141, 146, 157, 174, 180.
50. Snow, op. cit., pp. 413-35.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF15 East China
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Annex "A," Subparagraph 2c,
Political Background

POLITICAL DYNAMICS

SECTION ONE

THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA AND ITS AFFILIATED ORGANS

• 6065

The monopoly of political power in the hands of one party -- the Communist Party of China -- is the basic factor in the pattern of political dynamics of Communist China and of the East China Region. The power structure also sets certain limits to the decision-making process, which follows a course largely determined by the organizational and operational pattern of the Party. Hence, political dynamics -- the study of political power and political process -- should examine the Communist Party of China itself, its political control, and the election and politics of minor parties in the region.

Since political activities in Communist China are regulated and guided by the Party through a well-established network of control over organizations of all types, the Party rather than society as a whole generates the vitality which lies behind political force.

• 665 To generate the vitality and to control the course which society is to follow requires the adoption of a total approach to all problems and the mobilization of all available instruments of compulsion in society -- Party, government, and mass organization. The Communist Party of China hopes to accomplish this task through the injection of issues and the initiation of movements or campaigns. Issues are employed to capture popular attention and to agitate emotion in preparation for ensuing campaigns, and movements are the means used to achieve assigned goals.

Initiated by the Party, which gives the signal that sets all forces into action, a campaign[1] is at once a method of executing a mission, a device to test the efficacy of all organizations, and a means of eliminating undesirable elements. A campaign can be either of national or local nature,[2] directed toward the population as a

1. For discussion of campaigns, see Richard L. Walter, China Under Communism, the First Five Years, Yale University Press, 1955, pp. 77-100. Also, W. W. Rostow, The Prospect for Communist China, Cambridge, M.I.T., 1955, pp. 72-98.

2. Typical campaigns of a local nature introduced in farming communities would include Spring Plowing, the Summer Collection, Resist Drought, and Resist Flood.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF15 East China
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665 whole or a segment of the population. In the present context, a campaign should be regarded as a political device rather than as a manifestation of political or social process.

The centralization of both government and Party is another factor determing the pattern of political dynamics in the East China Region. The central organs of the Party employ four major means to control local agencies under their direction. The understanding of these means is essential to the examination of political dynamics in this region: (a) the maintenance of a unified and effective Party organization throughout the region, (b) the control of administrative and judicial organs, People's protectorates, public security organization for the execution of governmental politics, (c) the control of mass organizations, and (d) the agitation of popular enthusiasm, the manipulation of popular will, and ultimately, the control of elections and the composition of the People's congresses.

I. THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA IN THE EAST CHINA REGION

A. Present Status of the Party[3]

3. For information on the Communist Movement in the East China Region, consult Hsü Tsung-tse, Chung-kuo Hung-chün Ti Shih-nien, [Ten Years of the Chinese Red Army], Peking Hsüan-wen shu-tien, 1951; K'ang-jih Chan-cheng

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1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF15 East China
~~AF15~~ AF15

• 665 As a ruling party in the East China Region, many new tasks have been assigned to Communist Party organizations. As a result of the many municipal centers located in this area, tasks such as the administration of industry and economy and the direction of trade union movements are stressed. The following key policies are closely adhered to by the Party units in the region.

1. Party organizations are very flexible and are under constant adjustment in order to cope with new tasks assigned to the Party units in this region.

2. The Party maintains a constant membership drive with the idea of increasing the total membership to include workers, technicians, and intelligentsia.

3. A thorough indoctrination and training program imposes upon each member the duty of continuous rectification and remolding.

Finally the Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih expulsion of March 1955 and the subsequent

3. (continued) Shih-ch'i Ti Chung-kuo Jen-min Chieh-fang-chün [The People's Liberation Army During the War of Resistance Against Japan], Peking, Jen-min Ch'u-pan-she, 1953.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF15 East China
~~AF15~~ AF15

• 65 arrest of Hu Feng and P'an-Han-nien in July 1955[4] are of particular interest in an appraisal of Party affairs in the East China Region. As the first secretary of the East China Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in this region, and the chairman of the East China Military and Political Committee until his replacement by T'an Chen-lin, the third secretary of the East China Bureau during the Three-Anti Campaign in 1952, Jao Shu-shih's influence in this region, both in Party and government affairs, must be great. At the time of Jao's expulsion from the Party, Hsiang Ming, formerly deputy governor of Shantung Province and, since September 1952, vice-chairman of the East China Military and Political Committee, was also expelled. The determination of the Party to eliminate Jao's followers in the East China Region is further evidenced in the arrest of P'an Han-nien, the deputy mayor of Shanghai since 1949, concurrently the second secretary of the Shanghai municipal Public Security Bureau. These series of arrests point to the instability of Party organization in this region and may forecast possible arrests in the future.

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4. English text of the official statement of Kao-Jao purge, New China News Agency Daily Bulletin, London, No. 1278, April 7, 1955; that of Hu P'an expulsion (Chinese text) in Hua-ch'iao Jih-pao [China Daily News], New York July 19, 1955, p. 1.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF15 East China
AF15

• 665 B. Party Organization

The Communist Party organization in East China region is governed by three principles: (1) Party organization is an integrated system, a system that symbolizes the extreme centralization of political power and the greatest demand for unity and discipline. (2) Party organization is pyramidal in structure and is organized upon a territorial and functional basis. (3) Party organization is flexible. Any attempt to assume it to be stereotype form of organization is misleading and impractical.

1. Organization. The Communist Party organizaton in the East China Region was until early 1955 -- divided into two parts: (a) the delegates of the Central Committee of the Party to the region and (b) the local Party bodies, divided into the provincial Party layer, administrative district layer, county and city layer, and the ch'ü and hsiang [group of villages] layer.

Since the abolition of regional administration in East China in June 1954, delegates to the Central Committee of this region no longer exist. At the recent Party converence of the Communist Party in March 1955 and the 6th Plenary Session (Enlarged) of the Central Committee in October 1955, only

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF15 East China
~~AF15~~ AF15

665 Shanghai Bureau representatives were reported at the meetings.[5] This confirmed the anti-Communist speculation that the original East China Party Bureau and the Shantung Sub-Bureau no longer exist in this region. However, a discussion of the Party bureaus as the delegates of the Central Committee of the Communist Party is still necessary because there is a likelihood that the bureau organization may be re-established. In the past, the East China Bureau and the Shantung Sub-Bureaus have been very active in this region.

(a) Delegates of the Central Committee. In the East China Region, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China was represented by the East China Bureau and the Shantung Sub-Bureau. (Recently, a Shanghai Bureau has been organized, presumably having jurisdiction only in the metropolitan area of Shanghai.) While the East China Bureau had direct jurisdiction over the provincial Party organization in Kiangsu, Chekiang, Anhwei, and Fukien provinces, the Shantung Sub-Bureau held Party leadership only in the province of Shantung.

Until recently the East China Party Bureau has not been an active force. Jao Shu-shih's

5. Communiques on the conferences, New China News Agency Daily Bulletin, London, No. 1278, April 7, 1955, p. 4; and ibid., No. 1413, October 18, 1955, pp. 6-7.

665 infrequent appearances at public functions and the lack of political activity of the East China Military and Political Committee have long been noticed. This inactivity was probably caused by the clash of personalities of the Party leaders in this region. Jao's leadership had long been challenged by veteran Party leaders.

There are two channels through which the bureaus exercised their authority -- the Bureau Secretariat and the regional Party Conference. The Bureau Secretariat at its level maintains an organization and enjoys a power comparable to that of the Central Secretariat of the Party. The regional conference is a device which the bureaus had not hesitated to employ for the transmission of directives and for periodic controls. In the past few years, the bureau had convened many enlarged cadre conferences and administrative district secretariat joint sessions. Bureau departments had called meetins of their own, thereby placing Party functions completely under their respective jurisdiction.

(b) Local Party Hierarchy.[6]

1) Provincial Party layer: The Provincial Party unit is the highest layer of the

6. For local Party organizations, consult the Constitution of the Communist Party of China; English text in Liu Shao-Ch'i, On the Party, Peking, 1951, pp. 185-90.

665 Party hierarchy within a province. Its first obligation is to enforce the directives and decrees transmitted by the central Party, while maintaining leadership in all matters within the territory in which it operates.

2) Administrative District Party layer: The Party unit at this layer generally corresponds with that of an administrative district under the jurisdiction of the provincial government. It is one of the most important tiers in the Party hierarchy, for it devotes its major work to Party affairs and has considerable authority in the selection and placement of personnel -- Party as well as government -- within its jurisdiction.

3) County and City Party layer: Like the provincial Party organs, the county and city Party units have the dual task of carrying out Party work and of maintaining complete control over other administrative and mass organizations in the direction of government activities.

4) Ch'ü Party layer: Ch'ü Party units are directly responsible for the management of Party affairs and the implementation of Party policy. They are installed below city or county levels.

5) Hsiang Party layer: Hsiang Party units form the lowest layer of the local Party

665 hierarchy. It is here that the Party and government fusion is most obvious and the Party's control over the other administrative and mass organizations most clearly revealed.

In addition to the territorial division of Party organization -- the Central delegates to the region and the local Party hierarchy -- there is an organization known as the Party branch or Party cell. It is a part of the broad foundation upon which the pyramid rests. It acts as a link between the Party and the masses. Party branches are organized in any factory, mine, enterprise, street, army, government office, or school where there are three or more Party members. They can be grouped into general branches and Party committees or broken down into sub-branches and Party groups, depending upon the number of members and the place of operation.

2. Organization within each Party layer: A quadrupartite division of authority is maintained in each of these constituent Party units -- the Party Congress, the Party Committee, Control Committee, and the Party Conference.

a) The Party Congress: The Party Congress of each of these local units is the highest body of the respective Party organization. In theory, the Party congress at each local level meets every two years and performs similar functions. The Constitution of the Party provides that Party congresses are to supervise

•665 and lead the Party Committee by hearing its report, deciding on questions pertaining to that area, and electing members of the Party Committee and delegates to Party congresses at the immediate higher level, subject to the approval of the Party Committee at that level. Although the National Party Congress has not convened since 1945, the local Party congresses are encouraged to convene at more frequent intervals, a measure recently proposed by the principle of collective leadership.

b) Party Committee: The executive body of the Party unit is the Party Committee. At the provincial level, the Provincial Party Committee elects a Standing Committee which controls the Party Committee. Departments under the Standing Committee include: organization, propaganda, rural work, urban work, social affairs, and the united front; its commissions deal with trade unions, youth, and women; it also has offices of policy planning, military affairs, and other functions. Organizations under the Party Committee at other level vary in each case. However, the basic departments are included at all levels.

c) Control Committees: Another instrument under the Party Committee is the independent, yet integrated, system designated as the local Control Committee, established at the National Party Conference of the Communist Party of China in March 1955.[7] The new control

7. English text in New China News Agency Daily Bulletin, London, No. 1277, April 6, 1955, p. 3.

665 committees replace the Discipline Inspection Committee established in November 1949.

The committees may set up branch offices in enterprises, factories, cooperatives, and mass organizations. The committees are required to co-operate with other state control agencies as well as with the supervisory office in the government, the People's procuratorates, and public security agencies. Organizationally, members of the Committees are elected by the Party congresses or conferences of the respective levels, subject to the approval of the Party committees of the next higher level. Local control committees are also subject to the supervision and direction of the higher control committees. Their relationship is centralized and permits no deviation.

d) Party Conference: The Party Conference is convened by the Party Committee at the higher level. The conference is in fact an executive meeting of the Party unit at each level, and its representatives to the conference are appointed by the Party Committee. The conference has the power to appoint or remove one-fourth of the members of the Party Committee and to reach decisions on Party work as well as on personnel and policy-making of the Party within its jurisdiction. The Party conferences meet more oftehn than the Party congresses and in fact exercise certain powers for the latter. The Nanking Municipal Conference of November 1949

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF15 East China
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665 and the Second Chekiang Provincial Party Conference of April 2, 1950 are examples.

C. Party Expansion, Overhauling, and Indoctrination

1. Party Expansion. Party expansion is a constant process and a duty read into the Constitution of the Party branches. However, there have been two major membership drives in East China -- the 1952 drive and the 1955 expansion.

The first major membership drive in September 1952 was directed by the East China Bureau[8] upon the successful conclusion of the Three-Antis and Five-Antis campaigns. It continued through 1952 and was climaxed in 1953 by the launching of the first Five Year Plan. The drive was aimed at recruiting new members from among the activists selected from government offices, business enterprises, financial and economic units, factories, and farms. At this time Party membership in East China stood at 1,060,000, with more than 400,000 Party branches (cells) which had been in existence since 1950.[9] In the directive issued by the East China Party Bureau basic principles of the expansion were outlined. First, the eight qualifications of a

8. Liberation Daily, September 7, 1952, p. 1.
9. Ibid., July 1, 1950, p. 1.

665 Party member must be met. The eight conditions include the realization on the part of each member of the ultimate goal of the Party, the devotion of the life of each member to the cause and interests of the Party, and absolute obedience. Secondly, Party overhauling should be launched and undesirable Party members expelled from the Party. Thirdly, exploitation and bureaucracy must be eliminated.

For the preparation of this membership drive, the East China Bureau toward the end of 1951 held a special course under its Party school.[10] Nine-hundred graduates, drawn from district and county organizations, were specifically trained for the management of the membership drive. The department of organization of the South Kiangsu Special District Party Committee held a meeting for this purpose.[11] Party members were placed in charge of membership drives in all factories, government offices, trade unions, and other mass organizations in the five key industrial cities in that area, and working teams were organized to supervise and check the drive. Emphasis was placed on special classes for the activists who were ready for admission in cities and in rural center. Activists under this training program had to meet all

10. Speech of Jao Shu-shih at the graduation, ibid., December 6, 1951, p. 1.
11. Ibid., September 9, 1952, p. 1.

665 qualifications and were thoroughly examined.

This large-scale membership drive brought reports from many cities of the admission of new Communist members. From the Shanghai trade unions' Political Training School several groups of students were admitted into the Party; at one time, there were 1,069 students, of which 435 were new members.[12] The new members included 142 Corps members, 84 cadres chosen during the Three-Anti Campaign, 47 "model" workers, 35 "model" students, and 24 "meritorious activists" selected by the mass. In the city of Nanking in the first half of 1952 some 456 members were admitted to the Party.[13]

The second-largest Party membership drive initiated by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China at the Basic Rural Organization Conference in March 1955 helped to speed expansion in the rural areas.[14] The conference announced the establishment of 170,000 hsiang Party branches in the country's 220,000 hsiangs, with a total rural Party membership of about 4,000,000. In the East China Region, this membership drive continued since the completion of Party overhauling in the rural areas in 1952-53. In the nation as a whole,[15]

12. Ibid., September 8, 1952, p. 3.
13. Ibid., September 27, 1953, p. 3.
14. People's Daily, March 9, 1955, p. 1.
15. Ibid., May 19, 1955, p. 1.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF15 East China
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665 more than 700,000 peasants were admitted to the Party in 1954. In Anhwei Province, the rural Party membership was estimated at 47,000, and the Communists reported that 100,000 activists were ready for admission.[16] During the same period Party organization alo underwent an expansion; in the city of Shanghai, over 40,000 new members had been admitted; 80 per cent of these were classified as workers.[17] Even in privately owned factories, it was reported that some 987 Party branches had been established by September 1954.

On the other hand, repeated warnings were issued to avoid over-expansion in Party membership. An example was given by the Communists in two hsiang (villages) in Sou-hsin Chekiang Province, where thirty-five members were admitted to the Party; of this number, eleven members were unqualified. This failure to maintain a certain standard is a common phenomenon in the vigorous drives for Party expansion.

2. Party Overhauling. As a constant process, Party overhauling involves at least four major activities: (1) examination of ideology and political alertness of Party members; (2) review and criticism of individual work;

16. Ibid., February 11, 1955, p. 5.
17. Survey of Mainland Press Supplement, No. 1008, March 16, 1955, p. 6.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF15 East China
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665 (3) mobilization of mass participation in the criticism; and (4) promotion of political education and increased study.

Apart from constant overhauling, which begins upon the completion of a drive (a drive is differentiated from a campaign or a movement in that a drive is carried out on a much smaller scale and is perhaps only one part of a movement), major Party overhauling is sometimes launched. In East China, at least two major instances of Party overhauling can be cited: the 1950 rectification and the 1952 nationwide rural Party rectification campaigns.

A speech made by Mao Tse-tung in June 1950, calling for rectification, climaxed the reorganization and renovation of Party units in the East China Region. Jao Shu-shih's speech in March 1950,[18] and resolutions adopted at the First Party Congress of the General Branches of the East China Military and Political Committee and of the Shanghai Municipal Government in May 1950,[19] named Party reorganization as the immediate task of the Party. Reorganization became necessary because of the complexity of political conditions in the region and the need for adjustment after the seizure of power. The

18. Liberation Daily, March 21, 1950, p. 1.
19. Ibid., May 15, 1950, p. 2.

1:Stanford U, S-4, 5 1956 AF15 East China
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665 1950 rectification movement, which began in July in the East China Region only intensified the process of reorganization.

The nationwide rectification movement launched in 1952 in the rural communities was, however, more vigorous than the 1950 Party reorganization. The campaign was aimed at the elimination of undesirable elements within the Party -- the "new-rich," inactive Party members, and those who had been found guilty of corruption -- and the strenghtening of the agricultural producers' co-operative movement. The campaign did not begin until November 1952 because the Communists spent almost a year in preparation. During the preparatory period, the training of cadres and the conducting of experiments in certain selected areas were the two major tasks. The actual campaign took no more than four months. In the nation as a whole, 20 75,000 hsiang Party branches concluded the overhauling before the Spring of 1953; some 1,200,000 Party members were reported to be involved in this process. In the province of Shantung alone, 60,360 members of Party units were selected for overhauling. Of this number, 2,363 were expelled, 5,892 inactive members were either asked to resign from the Party or were forced to resign, and 1,846 members were punished.

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20. People's Daily, February 2, 1953, p. 1.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF15 East China
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665 3. Indoctrination and Training. The Communist Party maintains Party unity and discipline by constant indoctrination and training. This practice is aimed at the revitalization of individual adherence to Party doctrine, and gives each member additional training in his own field. In the East China Region, Party training is generally conducted in two types of schools -- a cultural school to raise the level of education and political alertness and an ideological school to strengthen adherence to doctrine.

A cultural school system was instituted in East China in 1951. It is jointly administered by the Party and the government. A directive of Central Committee of the Communist Party issued in January 1954 reaffirmed the need.[21] for such a school system. The directive reminded Party members of the fact that in the country as a whole, one-half of the cadres (mostly Party members) have had less than a junior high school education, and a portion are actually illiterate. To remedy this, nationwide cultural school system were instituted, and bringing both the individual members and the responsible secretaries below county and ch'ü levels into the plan. The plan called for the completion of cadre education to a level equivalent to that of grade school and/or that of junior high school. Also

21. Ibid., January 22, 1954, p. 1.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF15 East China
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665 included in the program, and to be completed in three to four months, was a class for the illiterate. The secretaries and administrative personnel of the Party who were unable to take time off during the day for schooling were to attend evening school, a twenty-week course, six hours per week. This program has been established throughout East China, and the responsibility for it rests mainly upon the county Party organizations.

The ideological school has a dual function -- to train Party members and to serve as a center for ideological training for candidates and members of other mass organizations. To organize and to carry on the teaching assignments is the job of the propaganda departments of the Party at all levels. Ideological schools were established in the major cities of Shanghai, Nanking, and Hangchow of Chekiang Province, Foochow of Fukien Province, and in Tsinan of Shantung Province. By 1953, it was reported[22] that there were 78 ideological schools with an enrollment of 42,000 persons in the East China Region. They were concentrated in the Shanghai area, where 74 schools were reported with a total enrollment of 33,000.

22. Ibid., January 27, 1953, p. 1.

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II. AFFILIATED PARTY ORGANIZATIONS

A. New Democratic Youth Corps (NDYC)

668 883 1. The Party and the Corps. The relationship of the Party to the New Democratic Youth Corps is such that the latter is controlled by the Party, as provided by the Constitution of the corps.[23] Party members are in charge of corps agencies above the county levels, thus placing the direction of all corps activities in the hands of the Party. The first function of the NDYC is to provide a reservoir of potential Party members. Its second task is to supply needed activists in all organizations. The corps membership in Shanghai in 1949, for example, stood at 37,889 and was distributed in all key organizations.[24] Of this number, 18,348 were workers, 14,599 were students, and 4,942 were teachers and office workers. The final task of the NDYC is to engage in the broadest possible range of activities in order to reach sections of society where formal Party organization is lacking.

•665 883 2. Organization. The organization of the NDYC in the East China Region is patterned after the Party. While national agencies

23. The Constitution of the New Democratic Youth Corps, ibid., July 7, 1953, p. 3.

24. Liberation Daily, January 1, 1950, p. 10.

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665 maintain an East China Working Committee as
883 the representative of the Central Committee of the NDYC in the region,[25] local corps, agencies are established at the provincial, municipal, and county levels. The local corps are empowered to establish representative working committees in the administrative district and ch'ü.

With the exception of those working committees at district and ch'ü levels, the constituent corps agencies rest upon a dual authority. Each level is to have a congress and a committee elected by it. These committees are the executive agencies of the corps and their component members are approved by the upper-level committee.

The corps branch, like the Party branch, is the link to the masses. It is formed in any factory, mine, enterprise, farm station, village, government agency, company (of the army), school, or street where there are three or more corps members. A general corps branch and corps committee may be formed, depending upon the size of the branch. These basic-level branches serve as forces of agitation, help to mobilize youth and the masses, and act as substitutes where Party agencies are lacking.

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25. Ibid., August 22, 1952, p. 1; The East China Committee was officially organized in August, 1952.

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668 883 B. The Young Pioneers

The relationship between the corps and the Young Pioneers is governed by the provisions in Chapter 7 of the Constitution of the NDYC. In the East China Region, efforts to organize youth between the ages of 9 and 15 into the Yount Pioneers were made in January 1950, a decision made by the Central Committee of the corps in October 1949. By April 1952, membership in the Young Pioneers in East China[26] was estimated at 1,200,000. Members were concentrated in the city of Shanghai, and their programs were patriotic. Since 1953, emphasis has shifted to recruitment of more members. National membership as of March 1955 was estimated at 70 million, or about 15 per cent of the youth in the 9-15 age group.[27]

SECTION TWO

POLITICAL DYNAMICS: POLITICAL CONTROL

• 665

Communist power in the East China Region is supported by three pillars -- the Party, the bureaucracy, and instruments of control, i.e., the military, public security agencies, and other

26. Liberation Daily, May 4, 1952, p. 3.

27. Kuang-ming Jih-pao [The Enlightenment Daily], March 14, 1955, p. 1.

1;Stanford U, S-4, 5 1956 AF15 East China
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665 supervisory agencies within and without the Party. In turn, the Party holds ultimate control over these instruments of force, as ensured by the establishment of a network of controls over all state organs and mass organizations. Thus, political control is maintained by placing Communist Party members in key positions in all organizations, by reserving for the Party all policy-making power, and by agitation, through which the Party mobilizes various political and social forces.

I. PARTY CONTROL OVER ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANS

A. Party and Government Fusion

Party control over government organs has been accomplished by the fusion of government and Party in authority, in fuction, and in personnel at all levels. The wide establishment of Party branches in all administrative organs and the subjection of Party members to Party discipline facilitated the fusion. As of 1950, some 251 Party branches had been organized in administrative units in the East China Military and Political Committee and the Shanghai municipal government.[28] Since 1948, at least

28. Liberation Daily, May 17, 1950, p. 1.

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•665 two systems within the Party -- the report system imposed upon the lower Party branches and members to report progress and seek instruction, and the inspection system, requiring upper Party organizations to enforce checks on lower Party branches -- have implemented this process.[29]

Another effective means of control is the placement of Party members in key administrative positions. On the regional level, for example, Jao Shu-shih was the first secretary of the East China Party Bureau and the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee in 1950 and concurrently the Chairman of the East China Military and Political Committee and the political commissioner to the Third Field Army under Ch'en I. Under the regional government the several commission chairmen were also Party secretaries,[30] holding key positions in both Party and administrative hierarchies.

At the provincial level, a similar pattern is observed. The then chairman of the Chekiang

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29. People's Daily, May 19, 1954, p. 1.

30. For example, Liu Hsiao, the chairman of the People's Control Commission of the East China Military and Political Committee was also the Second Secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee, and concurrently the head of the Department of Organization of the East China Party Bureau.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF15 East China
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•665 Province, Tan Cheng-ling, was also the first secretary of the Chekiang Provincial Party Committee. So also were Chang Ting Ch'eng of Fukien, K'ang Sheng of Shantung, and Su Yü of Nanking. The newly elected governors in this region in 1955 bear the same qualification. A governor of a province can either be concurrently the first secretary of the Party, as in the case of Yeh Fei of Fukien, or he may be the past first secretary of the Party Committee, as in the case of Sa Wen-han of Chekiang and Hui Yü-yü of Kiangsu. [See the chapter on Biographies of Key Personalities.] This fusion is even more obvious at lower levels.

B. Cadre Utilization

The Communist Party may also exercise control over state agencies through the selection and appointment of faithful and capable cadre (Party members as well as non-Party members) to serve in the judicial and administrative agencies. Such is the case in the East China Region, where the Party secretary was placed in charge of personnel offices of the administrative agencies. For example, Hu Li-chiao, the then deputy of the Organization Department of the East China Party Bureau, was the director of the Personnel Department under the East China Military and Political Committee.[31]

31. People's Handbook, 1952, Shanghai, Takung Pao, 1952, p. 181.

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• 665and, at the same time, held positions as deputy chairman of the People's Control Commission in the regional government and second secretary of the Discipline Inspection Committee of the East China Party Bureau.

After the Constitution was promulgated, all offices in charge of personnel were disbanded. This may indicate that the Party wishes to exercise firmer control of personnel policies.

C. Department of Supervision and Other Instruments of Control

The Communist Party exercises direct control over the government bodies through the offices of supervision, formerly the People's Control Commission. The offices of supervision are organized at all levels from the Central Government down to the county government. These offices are strictly controlled by the Party. As a rule, the heads of these offices are either Party secretaries in charge of Party organization or chiefs of public security agencies, a watchful guardian of the Party. Personnel working in these offices are mostly Party members and activists, who carry out only Party directives.

Unlike the people's procuratorate, which is called "judicial organ," the offices of

supervision are administrative agencies[32] and check only government employees to make sure they have correctly executed government policies and orders, and to check officials guilty of misdemeanors, disobedience, and corruption in the administrative organs and state enterprises. As of 1951, some 2,031 cases had been disposed of by the former People's Control Commission under the East China Military and Political Committee.[33] Of these, 324 were accused of "misdemeanors," 523 of "waste," 82 of exceeding authority," and 49 were convicted of "counterrevolutionary activity".

The highest supervisory agency in the East China Region before 1954 was the East China People's Control Commission, established in March 1950.[34] Similar commissions were organized in the provinces and administrative districts in this region between 1950 and 1951. The Shanghai People's Control Commission, for example, was established in June 1951. Presumably the Discipline Inspection Committee, established in May 1950 in all administrative units in the Shanghai municipal government, performed the control function.

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32. T'an Cheng-wen "Chien-ch'üan Jen-min Chien-ch'a Chih-tu, Kung-ku Kuo-chia Fa-chih", "Make the People's Procuratorate System Sound and the State Judicial System Secure," New China Monthly, No. 2, Feb. 28, 1955, pp. 28-29.

33. Liberation Daily, November 30, 1951, p. 2.

34. Report of the Commission, ibid., July 19, 1950, p. 1.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF15 East China
AF15

•665 Among the established control offices in this region, some were not performing their duties properly. The Tsinan Municipal People's Control Commission, organized in August 1950, is a case in point. As late as March 1955, this organization was not completely organized and its duties were neglected.[35]

Supervisory branches,[36] composed of 2-4 workers, have been established in state enterprises, financial and economic offices, transportation agencies, notably the railways, and post offices. In addition to their normal control function, they supervise the utilization of funds, the fiscal system, and matters relating to production and purchase.

The supervisory offices operate three networks of their own:[37] reporters, complaint boxes, and, reception rooms. People's supervisory reporters are sent out by the respective supervisory agencies or selected within the organization itself. They are organized into small working groups to spy on the individual worker either by making direct accusations or by handling accusations received from the complaint box or the reception room. The complaint box and the reception

35. People's Daily, March 20, 1955, p. 6.
36. Text of the direxctive, ibid., January 6, 1953, p. 1.
37. Ibid., March 11, 1953, p. 3.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF15 East China
AF15

665 room are means of encouraging accusations and complaints against government employees. All government agencies are required to have these facilities. During 1954, the Kiangsu provincial government was reported to have received an estimated 100,000 letters of complaint.[38]

II. PARTY CONTROL OVER MASS ORGANIZATIONS

668 Communist policies toward mass organizations have been well calculated and effectively carried out. From the Party point of view, mass organizations are political assets: they serve as links between the Party and the masses and they are the means by which the Party succeeds in organizing all sections of society. Each of these mass organizations represents a specific segment of the populace and is itself a social and economic force.

After the Communist seizure of power in East China, mass organizations were immediately organized. Not until 1952, however, were they placed upon a permanent basis. Mass organizations are represented in this region by branches in key cities and appropriate places, depending upon their type of service. The most influential are discussed here to illustrate the pattern of Party control.

38. Ibid., February 5, 1955, p. 3.

C. Election Campaign and Fund

666 The practice of joint nomination of candidates eliminates the need for election campaigning. Candidates from other parties and organizations so selected must, of course, first meet the approval of the local organs. Once approved, election is assured. If any campaigning is involved, it takes place only at the Party meetings and discussion group meetings, where the individual's qualifications may be questioned and some interrogation may become necessary. Article 8 of the electoral law permits disbursement of funds by the national treasury for election expenses. Since campaigning is rare, no provisions are made for the collection and use of campaign funds. Article 62 of the electoral law singles out bribery as an offense. Other unlawful practices, including violence, intimidation, and fraud, are regarded as offenses liable to fine or imprisonment.

II. POLITICS OF MINOR PARTIES

●665 After 1950 minor parties were established gradually in the key cities of the East China Region. They include the Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang (RCKMT), the China Association for Promotion of Democracy (CAPD), the Democratic League (DL), the Chinese Peasant Workers' Democratic Party (CPWDP), and the Chih Kung Tang (CKT).

665 The RCKMT, a party composed of former Kuomintang officials, forms the largest group participating in the government. The next largest is the Democratic League. As a party made up of petty bourgeoisie and intelligentsia, it serves as a symbol of coalition. The CAPD is a party of national bourgeoisie, including industrialists and capitalists. Its services are called upon for active support of the nation's economic programs. Minor parties having lesser political importance are drafted for other activities.

The status of the minor parties in this region is determined ultimately by their status in the central government. The status enjoyed by the minor parties changed after the promulgation of the Constitution. It is true that the Constitution also calls for the continued functioning of the people's democratic united front led by the Communist Party and composed of various democratic classes, parties, groups, and People's organizations; however, these democratic elements in China, particularly the minor parties, are rapidly sinking into obscurity.

In the first place, the local consultative committees of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (P.C.C.) which are the organizational forms of the United front, have ceased to be organizations of any political importance. The more than ten tasks

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF15 East China
AF15

665 assigned to them since 1951,[68] ranging from assistance to local governments, reporting public opinion, examining decrees submitted by the government, to participation in government-sponsored drives, are reduced to mere observance and enforcement of the Constitution of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference[69] and the holding of consultations in regard to the local work of the People's democratic united front. (Article 18 of the Constitution of the Chinese People's P.C.C.)

In the second place the participation of minor parties in the government is no longer effective, although minor parties are still able to participate in government affirs either through the nomination of candidates to the People's congresses or through the local consultative committees of the Chinese People's P.C.C. Equally significant is the reduction in the establishment of consultative committees below provincial level. The new constitution of the Chinese People's P.C.C. calls for the establishment of these committees only in provinces and in municipalities directly under the central authority.

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68. Yangtze Daily, September 8, 1951, p. 4.

69. English text of the Constitution of the Conference in Current Background, No. 309, December 25, 1954.

• 665 In the third place, with the consolidation of Communist political power at all levels, the position of minor parties is further endangered. For instance, the liquidation of private capitalists in the transitional stage would certainly reduce, in the end, the political position of the China Association for the Promotion of Democracy. Eventually minor parties will no longer exist as political forces in the ordinary sense because their political influence will be insignificant.

A. Control and Infiltration

665 668 The most effective way of eliminating minor parties and their activities is to exercise strict control over them either through direct subjugation or infiltration. A glance at the guiding principles to be observed by all minor parties participating in the Chinese People's P.C.C. would indicate the degree to which these minor parties have subordinated themselves to the will of the Chinese Communist Party. In addition to acknowleding the position of the Communist Party as the core of the state's power, minor parties "must assist the state organs and set the social forces in motion... maintain close contact with the masses... continue to consolidate and develop the alliance between China and the USSR... study Marxist-Leninist theories on a voluntary basis, study state policy, elevate political levels, practice criticism and self-criticism, and strive for ideological remolding." (General principles of

●665 the Constitution of the Chinese People's
668 Political Consultative Conference.)

The infiltration of the Communist Party into the minor parties to compel their final extinction is perhaps the regime's far-reaching design. In the East China Region this will be done by the control of membership policies of the minor parties by the Communist Party and by the training of members of the minor parties in charge of organizations. A training class[70] was held in November 1951. Their curriculum included Chinese Communist history and organizational policy; their instructors were Communist Party members. Certain conditions were established under which the expansion of minor parties was to take place. These parties must be free from "reactionary elements." To date, 55 persons have been expelled from the Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang, 76 per cent of this number for political reasons. Expansion has been restricted to big cities, and is not permitted in minority groups. Furthermore, activists were encouraged to enroll during the Resist-America-Aid-Korea Campaign.

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70. Liberation Daily, November 22, 195[illegible], p. 1.

B. Minor Parties and "Pressure Politics"

664
665 In a democracy, the degree of political activity of the minor parties determines the true measure of democracy. Likewise, special interest groups as such can enjoy their political privilege to influence public opinion or, through minor parties, participate in policy-making. In Communist China, where minor parties have only assigned duties to perform and where public information is monopolized by the Party, they exert no "pressure" upon the state organs which the Communist Party of China dominates, nor do they take part in policy-making.

On the other hand, deputies of the minor parties were allowed to make speeches and urged to comment on government policy at each session of the All-People's Conference. However, only praise for the Communist was expressed, with occasional criticism of faults the Communists themselves had already admitted publicly. One cannot tell whether their enthusiasm was, after all, spontaneous or a pretense.

CONCLUSION

665 The Communist Party since assumption of power has succeeded in consolidating its position in the East China Region. It has also succeeded, to a certain degree, in the maintenance of a militant and efficient Party

665 organization. It is trying its best to stimulate popular enthusiasm toward the regime.

The present tasks of the Party, calling for the rapid industrialization of the region and the administration of the many major municipal centers in East China, are tasks in which the Party must prove its further competency. Perhaps, the Jao Shu-shih purge and the P'an Han-nien expulsion indicated the complication of municipal administration which brought about dissension and personal conflict among the top Communist leaders. Equally serious is the constant Party rectification and the severe demands imposed upon all Party members. These practices plant seeds of discontent and distrust within the rank and file.

The Communist employment of terror and regimentation in the cities meet resistance, and Party members working in the cities are often exposed as inefficient and corrupt. The low educational level of the cadre and general apathy among Party members in the rural communities hamper the execution of Communist rural policies.

668 assigned as if it were a political decision.
578 Managers and workers in a factory are concerned with the attainment of the assigned quota, since a failure to meet the quota may bring severe punishment. To fulfill this quota, every means of control and competitive methods are used. This in turn creates additional tension among the workers. Although some factories have issued false achivement reports in order to reduce government demands for ever-increasing production schedules, the regime is making an effort to stamp out this practice.

• 665 Pressure and tension are most harmful
578 to the morale of the Party. The Party apparatus is the center of power and activity, and all Party directives and government policies are supervised by the Party. Therefore, a Party member is subject to at least two systems of pressure -- the Party and the state. A Party member is subject to an endless program of Party indoctrination and rectification, which results in the high loss of Party members either through expulsion or forced resignation. Indeed, the demands on a Party member are so great that many Chinese are reluctant to join the Party. The fate of the expelled Party members is unknown, but it is presumed that they are generally tried by a People's Court and sentenced to forced labor. Expelled Party members, if still at large, may form a counterrevolutionary group and join with other elements in subversive activities.

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633 tion. Foreign voters were not willing to [illegible]e a measure providing
466 purely for Chinese social welfare in the teeth of Chinese opposition. Following the failure to secure the proposed byelaw, the Council decided that, until the Chinese authorities themselves moved to regulate conditions of industrial employment, it would make no further attempt to concern itself with these issues. Larger forces, however, were at work. While the Settlement authorities were
• 665 attempting to limit the work of children, the Kuomintang, the National People's Party of China, met in Canton and adopted a much more extensive platform of social measures. In the late summer of 1926 the Kuomintang army began its march northward from Kwangtung Province and, by March 1927, had entered Nanking, which was to be the capital of the National Government for the next decade.

633 Shortly after, a unified Kuomintang-sponsored Chinese government came into control of the metropolitan area of Shanghai with the exception of the foreign-administered International Settlement and French Concession, and the Extra-Settlement Roads. A Bureau of Social Affairs, responsible for industrial conditions, was established by the new national government. Within two years of the failure of the Shanghai Municipal Council to obtain authorisation to regulate the employment of children, and its subsequent decision to await movement by Chinese government circles before attempting further action, machinery to introduce progressive action by the Chinese authorities had been made possible.

645 Between 1927 and 1932 the Ministry of Industries of the National
466 Government in Nanking promulgated a series of laws concerning labour. Among others these included a Factory Law, which regulated in general terms such matters as physical conditions and hours of work, wages in relation to living costs, compensation for accidents, termination of employment, factory councils and apprenticeship; a Labour Union Law; a Law governing Arbitration in Industrial Disputes; and others. The difficulty lay in the application of the code. Provisions regarding reform in factory conditions, for example, were so far reaching that early and complete conformity to the standards set could not be hoped for.

648 Moreover, the existence of the foreign-administered areas in
633 Shanghai raised jurisdictional issues. Since the Shanghai Municipal
466 Council was not specifically empowered under the Land Regula-
471 tions to regulate conditions of employment, the Chinese authorities